Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Since the unreviewed movies tend to be below average in quality, this practice provides a useful setting in which to test models of limited strategic thinking: Do moviegoers seem to realize that no review is a sign of low quality? A companion paper showed that in a set of all widely released movies 2000-09, cold opening produces a significant 20-30% increase in domestic box office revenue, which is consistent with moviegoers overestimating quality of unreviewed movies (perhaps due to limited strategic thinking). This paper reviews those findings and provides two models to analyze this data, an equilibrium model and a behavioral cognitive hierarchy (CH) model that allows for differing levels of strategic thinking between moviegoers and movie studios. The behavioral model fits the data better, as moviegoer parameters are relatively close to those observed in experimental subjects. These results suggests that limited strategic thinking may be a better explanation for naïve moviegoer behavior than equilibrium reasoning is.
Introduction
Game theory has sometimes been criticized as a descriptive model of business practice, or a source of normative advice, on the grounds that most analysis assumes people forecast accurately what others will do, and choose best responses given their accurate (equilibrium) forecasts. Recently, models have been developed which allow plausible limits on strategic thinking. These models are particularly useful because their basic principles can apply to many different games. One class of models that has been applied to many data sets is a "cognitive hierarchy" (CH) model of levels of steps of thinking (and its close relative, level-k). These models have been used to explain normal form games in a wide variety of experimental 1 and field settings, 2 but the only applications of these theories to games with private information so far are analyses of auctions. 3 This paper explores the generality of these approaches through the first field application of models of limited strategic thinking to games with private information.
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The setting we study is Hollywood movies. Movie studios generally show movies to critics well in advance of the release (so that critics' reviews can be published or posted before the movie is shown, and can be quoted in newspaper ads). However, movies are often deliberately made is sometimes called "unravelling." 5 We proceed with the maintained hypothesis that complete unravelling should occur in theory, if studios and consumers are perfectly rational.
The CH models also proceed through the steps of strategic thinking in the rational unravelling argument, except that they assume that some fraction of moviegoers end their inference process after a small number of steps. For example, a 0-level moviegoer thinks that cold opening decisions are random (they convey no information about quality) and hence infers that the quality of a coldopened movie is average. A 1-level studio anticipates that moviegoers think this way and therefore opens all below-average movies cold, and shows all above-average movies to critics. Higherlevel thinkers iterate more steps in this process. Observed behavior will then be an average of the predicted behaviors at each of these levels weighted by the fraction of moviegoers and studios who do various numbers of steps of thinking. (More details of this model are given in section 3).
The data generally do not agree with the standard full disclosure model. Roughly 10% of the movies in our sample are opened cold (though that fraction has increased sharply in recent years). Regressions show that cold opening appears to generate a box office premium (compared to similar-quality movies that are pre-reviewed, and including many other controls). Since box office returns are strongly correlated with subjective quality (measured by either critic or fan ratings), the cold opening premium suggests fans think the movie is better than it actually is. We also conclude that this explanation is consistent with four of five stylized facts in this environment, none of which can be explained by a neoclassical model. In the most similar theoretical work, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) do provide a model of a disclosure process with both informed and uninformed consumers, although it does not specifically address limited strategic thinking.
We then fit a baseline Nash Equilibrium model, similar to Seim (2006) , in which studios coldopen movies when they receive a private idiosyncratic error, and a model using CH, that can be augmented to allow disequilibrium using two separate CH parameters for moviegoers and studios. 7 Both baseline and CH models have roughly similar estimates for studio choices, since cold-openings are quite rare as predicted by equilibrium and CH models with high levels of thinking (there is less data with actual cold-opening box office to fit the model). However, the baseline model cannot predict cold-opening premiums from moviegoer choice while the CH model can.
The estimates for moviegoers thinking in the CH model, especially in the period 2000-2005, are roughly consistent with experimentally observed data. Studios in the later period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) also have lower estimates of perceived steps-of-thinking, suggesting they may be learning to best respond to moviegoers' limited rationality.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses data on quality ratings, box-office returns, and control variables, and presents some regression results on the existence of a box-office premium for movies that are cold opened. Section 3 describes the Bayesian-Nash and CH models. Section 4 estimates parameters of those models based on studios' decisions and the box office revenue. Section 5 concludes and discusses future extensions to management-related research.
Data
Much of the data and details of regression conclusions are reported in a companion paper (Brown et al., in press) so we will summarize those results which are relevant to the analysis of this paper. 7 The mismatch between the degree of strategic thinking of moviegoers and studios is not typically observed in experimental data. However, keep in mind that experiments rarely use mixtures of populations which are more and less strategically sophisticated, so it is perhaps not surprising that the estimate of studio strategic thinking is very high, and is much higher than the moviegoer estimates.
4
In much of the analysis we will make a distinction between movies from 2000-2005 and 2006- 2009, a distinction that was not made in the companion paper.
The data set is all 1414 movies widely released in more than 600 theaters in the US in their first weekend, over the decade from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2009. Critic and moviegoer ratings are both used to measure quality. Metacritic.com normalizes and averages ratings from over 30 movie critics from newspapers, magazines, and websites. These have a roughly normal distribution between 0 and 100. For estimation purposes, we use the percentile score of those ratings so that they are standardized to a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. The metacritic rating is available for all non-cold-opened movies on the day they are released and is available on Monday for cold-opened movies. Because these ratings occur so early in a film's release, we assume the ratings help determine box office revenue and not vice versa (i.e., critics aren't influenced by box office). Other variables (such as, cold opening, box office revenues, movie genres and ratings, production budgets, and star power ratings) are collected from various data sources (see appendix). Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables. All these variables were used in a regression model to test if movies that are cold opened have significantly greater opening weekend and total US box office revenues. The table also shows separate variable means for the cold-opened movies. The cold-opened movies are somewhat statistically different in a few dimensions-they tend to be smaller in budget and theater coverage, have less well-known stars, and over-represent some genres (e.g., suspense/horror).
Each movie, j, has a standardized metacritic.com rating q j , a dummy variable for whether a a. T-tests assume unequal variance. Standard error is the square root of the weighted average of sample variances. b. For movies that do not have a second actor (e.g., a nature documentary with a narrator). The second star value is chosen arbitrarily high at 6 billion to represent the effect of no second star. c. This value is calculated in regard to the Friday of a movie's "opening weekend." We follow the industry's classification on opening weekend, and make no decisions ourselves. d. There are 1414 observations for all variables except 1413 (1251 screened, 162 cold) for metacritic and 1303 (1155 screened, 136 cold) for production budget. 6 movie was cold opened, c j (=1 if cold), and a vector X j of other variables. The model is
where y j is opening weekend or total US box office for movie j in 2005 dollars, standardized using the CPI index (www.bls.gov). Table 2 shows regression results on logged total box office revenue and logged opening weekend revenue, respectively.
The point of these initial regressions is not to estimate a full model with endogenous studio decisions (we will estimate such a model in section 4). Instead, the regression is simply a way of determining whether there is a difference in the revenue between cold-opened and reviewed movies. Under the standard equilibrium assumption that all quality information of cold-opened movies is inferred by logical inference of moviegoers, we should see no difference in revenues, and the cold-opening coefficient should be zero. If this is the case, it is good evidence for the Nash unravelling argument, and there is no interesting pattern for the behavioral theories to explain. The cold-opening coefficients in the first row of table 2 show, that cold opening a movie is positively correlated with the logarithm of opening weekend and total US box office revenues.
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In this paper the analysis will often be separated over the years 2000-2005 and 2006-2009. This is because the frequency of cold opening doubled in 2006 and persisted at the same level through 2009. (In financial economics it is common to break a long period into subperiods to test for robustness of effects and we adapt that method here as well.) There is no structural change in the movie industry in 2006 which justifies separating the entire sample into these two periods, but since studios never make this choice. We account for the effect of this selection for cold opening using propensity matching in this section and later in our structural model (sections 3 and 4).
Propensity score matching techniques involve running a logistic regression to determine which other variables are the most associated with a cold-opening (see appendix) these predicted cold probabilities can be used to estimate which movies were the most likely to be cold opened. Running weighted regressions with these values, we can ignore movies that are very unlikely to be cold opened and match movies that were and were not cold opened but had similar propensities. Table   3 shows the results of three types of propensity score matching for weekend and cumulative US box office data.
The propensity score matching results find that cold opening is correlated with a 35-55% positive increase in revenue for US opening weekend and cumulative box office. This result suggests a poor-quality movie could increase its revenue by one-third to one-half by cold opening. Nearest neighbor matching-a technique that matches each cold-opened movie (j) with the regular released movie that has the closest propensity (to j) to have been cold opened-finds the highest positive correlation of 50%. Other matching techniques that use more movies (596 vs. 72), but weigh each film differently, predict a lower value for the cold-opening premium (30%-40%).
Taken together, these results suggest that the positive cold-opening premium is not a result of comparing cold-opened movies to larger, blockbuster movies that would never be cold opened, since the propensity of these large movies is low and they are ignored and receive low weight. Instead, the better differential performance of cold-opened movies compared to their equally poor quality screened-for-critics, counterparts is associated with the cold-opening premium.
However, there is further evidence to suggest the cold-opening premium was not as pronounced it may be due to other factors. Nonetheless, the overall result on the profitability of cold-opened movies is strong: there is a pronounced "cold-opening" premium in the data in the entire sample, using both regression and propensity matching.
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Five Stylized Facts about Cold Openings
Our companion paper, Brown et al. (in press ), notes five main stylized facts about cold openings that any explanation for cold-opening must explain. That paper argues that other explanations such as moviegoers not learning about reviews, angry critics and consumer-critic differences, are unlikely to explain all five facts. The box office premium could be due to an omitted variable that is correlated with the decision to cold open, a possibility which is difficult to rule out. Interviews with industry executives did not suggest any such variable. A promising candidate variable is an unusually good print ad or movie trailer that makes an awful movie look great. Studios should spend extra on marketing to promote such movies if they cold open them. However, the interaction between (demeaned) marketing budget and cold opening dummy has a negative and highly significant effect on box office in both time periods (the full-sample coefficient is −0.276, t = −3.46).
Thus, unusually expensive marketing is associated with lower cold-opening box office, which is inconsistent with a "great trailer" type of omitted variable explanation.
We do not go into details of other explanations here (see Brown et al., in press ). Instead we note that the standard Nash model cannot explain any of these facts, but an extended version of the CH model has an explanation for all five. The facts are:
1. There is an apparent correlation between cold opening and US box office revenue.
2. The correlation is very similar whether quality ratings are derived from critics (metacritic)
or from fans who saw the movie (IMDB).
3. The correlation is less pronounced in non-US markets, especially the foreign language market Mexico, where releases are typically later, after US reviews are available. The standard neoclassical model cannot easily explain any one of these five facts. It does not predict a cold-opening premium (fact 1 and 2). It does not predict differential performance of coldopenings in other markets, since quality information should be correctly inferred in all markets (fact 3). It does not explain why cold-opened movies have lower IMDB fan ratings (fact 4). Since it predicts cold-openings should not happen, or should only happen by studio idiosyncratic error, it does not predict why they should be more frequent in the second part of the data set (fact 5).
A CH model can provide plausible explanations for the first four facts, and the conclusions of 13 experiments that inspired the CH model can provide an explanation for fact 5. Cold-openings generate a box-office premium due to the limited strategic thinking of moviegoers in non-disclosure, as they believe cold-opened movies have higher quality than in actuality (facts 1 and 2). In foreign markets where quality information is already known, cold-openings do not have this premium as moviegoers infer quality correctly (fact 3). More moviegoers go to cold-openings than if the movie had been screened for critics, because they infer quality incorrectly, therefore the average fan rating of cold-opened movies will be lower than screened movies (fact 4).
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Fact 5 is that the rate of cold opening goes up over time. The baseline model explanation of this fact is that idiosyncratic error is going up over time, which is unlikely. However, the CH model does not have an immediate explanation of the rate of increase either. Keep in mind that CH models were initially developed to explain "pre-equilibrated" behavior in one-shot games (and to supply initial conditions for learning models). They may or may not have much explanatory power in settings like this, in which studios and moviegoers make a few decisions a year over ten years.
Our explanation is that early in the sample, studios underestimated how naïve moviegoers could be (evidenced by the very high estimates of strategic sophistication in 2000-2005, see section 4 for these estimations). While moviegoers learned slowly, studios learned more quickly after noticing that cold opened movies often did fine at the box office despite no reviews (or, in the CH approach, because there were no reviews). This asymmetry in learning is consistent with the rise in cold openings over time, but there may well be other explanations that are not incorporated in either 10 For an explanatory example, consider the moviegoer who overestimates a movie's quality based on strategic naïveté. Suppose that if he knew the movie's true quality, or knew that it was cold opened and inferred correctly its lower quality, he would not see it in theaters. This type of moviegoer is present in the audience of cold-opened movies but does not go to movies screened for critics. Thus IMDB ratings for cold-opened movies are lower, all else being equal, because these moviegoers bring down their ratings, but not for movies screened for critics. By analogy, imagine an expensive restaurant that posts a menu online but does not list prices. If the highest-priced restaurants withhold prices, and naïve diners do not infer that relation, they will always be complaining about the surprisingly expensive prices at the restaurants they go to that did not post a menu. 14 equilibrium or CH models.
The General Model
The initial regressions in Section 2 were not designed to understand the endogenous choice of studios to cold open and the likely reactions of moviegoers. Instead, we create a structural model of movie viewing and studio choice where moviegoers choose whether to see a movie and studios choose whether to screen the movie for critics. Our aim is to create a model that can be analyzed with box office data and studio choice, in which each side simultaneously maximizes utility and profit respectively, but also a model that we may augment to allow estimation of parameters of limited strategic thinking concerning beliefs. To ensure that we can calculate equilibrium strategies for moviegoers and consumers this model is static. However, we will examine the model over two different time periods to account for the sudden and sustained increase in cold opening at the end of our dataset (i.e., 2000-2005 and 2006-2009, see figure 1 ).
Formally, let movie j have characteristics X j that are known to the studio and moviegoers.
We assume that studios know the quality of their movie, q j and then choose whether to open cold (c j = 1) or to screen for critics in advance (c j = 0). Moviegoers do not know q j , and form a belief E m (q j |c j , X j ) that depends on a movie's characteristics X j and whether it was cold opened c j .
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To model moviegoer utility functions and studio profit functions, we use an approach similar to Seim (2006) who examined the equilibrium entry decision in the video rental market of multiple firms. While her paper examined an equilibrium of homogenous firms, our paper examines the equilibrium between moviegoers and studios who have different objective functions.
12 Moviegoers form utility estimates of a given movie based upon its characteristics and expected quality, subtracting the ticket price, γ.
The term j represents moviegoers' idiosyncratic preferences over movie j. Similar to Seim (2006) we assume this term is private information known to the moviegoer and independently and identically distributed from a logisitic distribution (e.g., McFadden, 1974) . We define the opportunity utility of not going to the movies as zero. 13 The probability that the moviegoer will go to movie j with characteristics X j and expected quality E m (q j |c j , X j ), at ticket price γ 14 is
We use a representative-agent approach to model moviegoers. We assume p(
is the total share of moviegoers that go to movie j. 16 We define the constant M as the maximum amount of box office revenue that could be earned in the period if every moviegoer went to a movie.
Then we can define expected revenue as
Movie studios make decisions whether to screen movies for critics based on their expected revenues (equation (4)). Studios also have idiosyncratic error term, υ j , about the additional success of the movie if it is cold opened. As with the moviegoer error term, υ j is private information to studios and independently and identically logistically distributed. Studios will cold open a movie ifR (1, X j , q j ) + υ j >R (0, X j , q j ). The probability that a studio will cold open movie j given its characteristics, X j , and quality, q j is
The term, E m (q j |0, X j ), the expected quality of a movie that is released to critics, is determined 16 We choose this approach rather than aggregating p(X j , E m (q j |c j , X j )) over some N to avoid arbitrarily large precision in our observations. Since box-office numbers and studio decisions will be combined in an maximum likelihood estimation process to estimate the parameters of this model jointly, we believed each observation should be counted equally. If we chose to have N consumers to make up box office, we then have N times more precision on our moviegoer data compared to studio data.
exogenously. Because critics can write about a movie they screen as well as reveal their estimates about quality in ways that are relatively costless (i.e., internet sites, newspapers), we assume that if a movie is screened to critics, its quality is then perfectly known to moviegoers. We also assume studios are aware that critics reveal their quality. Assumption 1 states that for movies screened to critics, moviegoers have accurate perceptions of the quality of the movie, and studios have accurate perceptions about moviegoer perceived quality.
We make also make a simplifying assumption about moviegoer perceived quality that allows our structural model to match our motivating example. Recall that in our disclosure example, we went through iterations of quality (e.g., 50, 25, 12.5) without discussing other movie characteristics (X j ). Our models will also make this assumption.
As Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) demonstrate for all disclosure games, E m [q j |1] = 0 in Nash equilibrium, as the system completely unravels. 18 Our estimation techniques will use maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters α, and β that best fit the joint system. This estimation technique is explained in detail in section 3.2.
17 Quality could also be known with noise and all results would hold if moviegoers are risk-neutral. 18 Alternatively, one could consider the value E m [q j |1] to be bounded on the interval [0, 100] in a general form of the Cursed Equilibrium model (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) . We will estimate the Nash equilibrium model in this paper, and leave the alternative specification in the appendix.
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A Cognitive Hierarchy Model for Moviegoers and Distributors
The alternative structural behavioral model which originally inspired this research, the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004 ) makes a different assumption about E m (q j |1) than the equilibrium restrictions in assumption 2. The behavioral model relaxes the assumption that moviegoers go through all the iterations of strategic thinking necessary to reach the game's Nash equilibrium and corresponding quality estimate. Similarly, distributors may best respond to moviegoers who have only done a limited number of steps of strategic thinking. The CH model can characterize aggregate strategic behavior with a single parameter, τ .
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The CH model assumes that there is a population of individuals who do varying numbers of steps of iterative strategic thinking. The parameter τ determines the distribution of steps of thinking by the one-parameter Poisson distribution
where τ is the mean number of steps of strategic thinking. To develop the model similar to our baseline, we restrict moviegoer inference of quality to not include specific movie characteristics, by revising assumption 2.
Zero-level moviegoers do not think about the studio's actions of cold opening a movie. They act as if the movie's quality is average E 0 m (q j |1, , τ ) = 50. 20 They will go to any movie with
A 0-level studio will best respond to the 0-level moviegoer. 21 The 0-level studio calculates the expected revenue from cold opening a movie as
It will therefore cold open movie j with probability
Proceeding inductively, for k > 0 moviegoers will consider the expectations of all moviegoers of lower types (k < k). They will form a conditional expectation using τ of lower level types and assume studios only cold-open movies with quality lower than that expectation (as in our motivating example). Their expectation about the quality of cold-opened movies will be the average quality of movies below that threshold. Formally,
Notice that (10) fits our motivating example well. A 0-level moviegoer believes cold-opened movies have quality of 50. A 1-level moviegoer knows this fact, assumes studios will only coldopen movies below quality of 50, and given a uniform distribution of quality infers cold-opened movies have quality 25. A 2-level moviegoer averages 50 and 25 using τ and believes expected quality is half this average as studios best respond to a distribution of 0 and 1-level moviegoers. A k-level moviegoer will attend a movie using the same equation as before,
For k > 0 a studio best responds to a distribution of k ≤ k determined by τ . Their choice to cold open is also dependent on their movie's specific characteristics through expected revenue. They will calculate expected revenue usinḡ
21 This leads to k-level, movie-specific, probability of cold opening,
As an example, table 4 shows values for the first ten steps of thinking for a cold-opened movie, When a Stranger Calls, when τ m = 1.638 and 100. Moviegoers' inference is determined by (10).
They make a decision whether to go to the movie from (11) which determines the proportion of moviegoers that attend. A k-level studio best responds to a distribution of moviegoers k ≤ k.
Since they know the quality of their movie they make a decision about whether to cold open by comparing the expected revenues given moviegoers' inferred quality (conditional on a cold open choice) and the true quality, and including an idiosyncratic error term (to model stochastic choice).
Notice that the values of inferred quality are the same for all movies given the steps of thinking (they do not depend on X j by assumption 2 ), but the proportion of moviegoers that see the movie and the cold-opening probabilities depend on X j so those values are unique to this movie.
Estimation
Before the estimation procedure is explained, a few of the numbers used in the process must be clarified. The logic of the model and our data (see section 2 and table 2) suggest that cold opening most strongly affects the first weekend's revenue (which may then affect cumulative revenue).
Therefore, we use the first weekend's revenue to calibrate the models' revenue equations and studio decisions. Thus, our representation of revenue, R (X j , E m (c j , X j )), will use weekend box office revenue normalized to 2005 dollars. Movie ticket prices are also in 2005 dollars. The value M , the maximum possible box office, is chosen as double the highest weekend gross over the set being a. Inferred quality by levels of thinking is the same for all movies. By assumption, it does not depend on X j . b. Moviegoer attendance and probability of cold-opening do depend on X j , so these values are specific to this movie.
evaluated. 22 Movie quality, q j is the standardized version of the average metacritic rating used in section 2. Movie characteristics X j are the independent variables used in the initial regressions on weekend box office in section 2, excluding cold opening and critic rating. The term c j has the same value as the cold dummy in section 2.
We jointly estimate the parameters using box office revenue data and studio-cold-opening decisions in a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Equation 4 which represents the expected box office revenue in our model is non-linear and requires a transformation to fit a linear model. We estimate the model equation with movie specific error term ξ j which is normally distributed,
Denoting the residuals of this linear model as e, we have a log likelihood function,
Since σ 2 is unknown it will be estimated by
where N is the number of movies and Q are the number of movie characteristics including quality.
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The log likelihood for the studio decisions is calculated using the estimated predicted probabilities of cold opening. For each set of parameter values, there is a predicted probability that a cold-opened movie would have been cold opened (π(X j , q j )). Similarly, for each set of parameter values, there is a predicted probability a movie that was screened for critics would have been screened for critics (1 − π(X j , q j )). The studio log likelihood function is the product of these values, logged.
The partial log likelihoods are summed to form a likelihood function that incorporates both boxoffice revenue and studio decisions. Estimates for the parameters in the model are obtained by maximizing the function L(α, β) defined by equation 17.
For a given set of values, (β, α), 24 are both put into (15) and (16) and logged, and then summed to get a likelihood value in equation (17). Maximum likelihood parameter estimates, (α * , β * )
are obtained using an optimization algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965 ) that begins at the origin.
Standard errors of all coefficients are obtained by 100 random bootstraps of the data set using the same algorithm. For the bootstraps the algorithm is started at the parameter estimates (α * , β * )
instead of the origin.
The CH model uses the same basic maximum likelihood estimation procedure as the standard model. The difference is the addition of the parameter τ . Because moviegoers and studios are different types of players with different objective functions and levels of experience, the two types of players are allowed to have differing τ parameters. Moviegoers have parameter τ m and studios have parameter τ s . 25 This will allow us to infer whether the degree of limited thinking by both studios and moviegoers are similar (i.e., if τ m ≈ τ s ).
As with the standard model, we jointly estimate the parameters of the CH model. For a given set of values (α, β, τ m , τ s ) where τ m , τ s ≥ 0, α, β, and τ m are used to compute the expected box office of cold opened (those where c j = 1) movies.
26,27
24 An alternate baseline specification treats E(q j |1) as a free parameter instead of setting it to 0, see appendix for the results of that specification. 25 An alternative approach would be have only one τ for moviegoer and studio behavior and jointly estimate it based on studio decisions and box office data. The trouble with approach is that because cold-opening occurs so infrequently, the number of observations that determine the studio's parameter τ s are roughly ten times as great as the number of observations that determine moviegoers' behavior τ m . For this reason any joint estimation of this type will be highly biased toward studio behavior (which already resembles the standard model), and neglect the cold-opening premium, the primary motivation for this exercise. 26 In all estimations, for a given parameter value τ equations (18) and (13) are approximated up to the level k = 100. All probability for values k > 100 was assigned to k = 100. A τ value of 100, the upper limit, was an entire distribution of 100-level thinkers. 27 To allow an identical maximum likelihood estimation procedure with the baseline model, this value is converted into a single quality dimension,q, such that
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The parameters α, β, and τ s are then used to compute the probability of each movie being cold opened using equation (13). Those values are put into equation (16) are obtained using a Nelder-Mead optimization algorithm that begins at the origin. Standard errors of all coefficients are obtained by 100 random bootstraps of the data set using the same algorithm.
For the bootstraps the algorithm is started at the parameter estimates (α * , β * , τ * m , τ * s ) instead of the origin. The results of both estimations are given in the next section. The one parameter for which the models differ is, importantly, the predicted cold premium. In
Structural Estimation Results
Basically,q functions as the single value of expected quality that would generate the same expected revenue as the CH model with parameter τ m . This value is used for all cold opened movies, and q j is used for all regularly released movies, to calculate the partial log likelihood in equation (15). Table 5 : Parameter estimates for jointly estimated baseline and CH models by time period, using weekend box office revenue and cold-opening decisions data. Tables displaying coefficients for It is true that the log likelihood is only slightly better for CH than for the baseline model.
However, the only difference in fit comes from explaining a small percentage of cold openings (around 10%) and a modest premium (around 20%). Furthermore, the baseline model clearly misestimates the sign of the box office premium, so while the overall fit is not bad, the adequate fit comes from an idiosyncratic error explanation that gets the economics wrong. And, the difference 
Conclusion
This paper is the first to apply a parametrized behavioral model to a game of disclosure in the field, an example of "structural behavioral economics." We study a market in which information senders (movie studios) are strategically withholding information (the quality of their movie) from information receivers (moviegoers), by not showing movies to critics in time for reviews to be published before opening weekends. Contrary to the simple Nash equilibrium, there is a "box office premium"-cold-opened movies earn more than screened movies with similar characteristics.
We provide two structural models to explain the environment being studied. The baseline model has moviegoers expect cold openings to have the worst possible quality, and critics to coldopen entirely though idiosyncratic error. The CH model with a low number of thinking steps τ m to represent moviegoer naïveté, and a high τ s to represent studio over-sophistication has the same general qualities of the baseline model but is also able to predict the cold-opening premium.
Further, the best-fitting τ m values for moviegeors, derived from box office data, are relatively similar to those observed in laboratory studies. The studio's τ s are much closer to Nash levels than those observed in laboratory experiments, but the shift of values from 2000-2005 to 2006-2009 suggests that studios may be learning to better respond to relatively naïve moviegoers.
The question remains why moviegoers have become more naïve about cold-openings and appear to be regressing rather than learning. Cold openings appear to have increased in profitability in the later part of the decade, suggesting if anything consumers are inferring less about their quality than before. While factors like repeated play and reputation of studios may explain the reluctance of studios to cold-open, the continued naïveté of moviegoers is difficult for standard game-theoretic models to explain. 29 One explanation we prefer, though cannot prove, concerns the population of moviegoers. A third of tickets are sold to young moviegoers (age 12-24) (MPAA, 2010) . While moviegoers might learn over time that cold-opened movies are surprisingly bad, the market has overlapping generations. New, naïve moviegoers are always entering the population;
there is no reason to expect rapid convergence of beliefs across such a population. Of course, this explanation is just speculation, and it is an open research topic to determine the dynamics of relatively young consumer populations.
This paper has connected a major area of economics and management research, models of limited strategic thinking, with a major area of economic research, games of selective disclosure.
From a management perspective, companies may have some intuitions that it can be advantageous to selectively withhold bad quality information, not strictly following the equilibrium analysis of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) (see Brown et al. (2009) for examples). However, this paper begins to uncover what level of bad information should be withheld, and can help explain why. We find that in the movie industry, it appears that studios are withholding too little, although they appear to be learning quickly. While the industry studied here, major movie studios, is quite unique, the main parts of the industry-products of unknown quality and critical review-are found in other industries. Moreover, many industries involve concentrated sellers than can learn to withhold and diffuse rotating consumers that will likely have difficulty learning. This suggests our approach could be applied to other industries: models of strategic thinking could be used in any industry that involves disclosure to examine what level of disclosure is optimal for managers given the limited strategic thinking of consumers.
Appendices: Not for Publication
A Description of Variables
To determine if a movie was cold opened (c j = 1) we examined the dates on three or four major news publications (the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and New York Post). If the dates of reviews in any of these publications were later than the release date, we examined the reasoning behind the late reviews. A movie was classified a "cold open" if at least one source stated the movie was not screened for critics before release (in most cases, none of the available sources had advance reviews).
Weekend and total US box office data as well as total box office data for international markets for movies from January 2000-June 2006 were obtained from a FilmSource database (Nielsen EDI, www.filmsource.com). The FilmSource database also included the number of theaters that showed a movie during its first weekend, the number of days in the opening weekend, and if the movie was released before Friday (generally only for anticipated blockbusters). FilmSource also gave a description of the genre of the movie, its MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, R), and whether the movie was adapted from previous source material. After June 2006 these values were obtained from the pro service of IMDB.com and boxofficemojo.com. All rental numbers were obtained from these two sites.
Production budget information came from IMDB.com for most movies, and from boxofficemojo.com or the-numbers.com for those missing from IMDB.com. Budget data were available for 1313 of the 1414 movies, including 138 or the 163 cold openings (85%).
The pro version of the IMDB.com database was used to determine the star power rating of each 1 movie's stars. Each week IMDB.com determined this value by ranking the number of searches done on the IMDB.com site for every person affiliated with movies. The most searched star would have value 1. Since there are over one million stars on IMDB.com, we took the natural logarithm of the star ranking to reduce the effect of unknown stars with very high numbers. We averaged the logged star ranking for the top two stars for each movie during its opening week.
Three other variables, competition (the average production budget of other movies released on the same opening weekend), the summer dummy variable (whether the movie was released in June, July and August), 30 B List of movies cold-opened movies included in our dataset Tables   Tables A.2 and A.3 provide full regression results for the regressions used in the paper as well as an alternative specification which only includes the variables found to be significantly correlated with box office revenue. Table A .4 shows the results of the regression that determined the propensity score matching results used in this paper. Table A 
